Tags: anti-debugging ptrace re 

Rating: 5.0

## KeyGenMe
By: theKidOfArcrania

The original writeup for this can be found [here][11].

Here is the problem description:

> I bet you can't reverse this algorithm! [attachment][1]

### tl;dr
I first ran `ltrace` to extract the `strcmp` line (to see what hash it is
comparing with), then solved for the decrypted hash, and sent the answer to
the server. Here is my python script for that:
from pwn import *

def getCheck(iden):
hasher = "ltrace ./exec2 ./elf2.patch.bin %s %s 2>&1 > /dev/null | grep strcmp | sed 's/.*\.\.\.\, //' | sed 's/...) = .*//'"
h = process(hasher % (iden, 'f' * 32), shell=True)
line = h.recvline()[1:][:-2]
return line

def sendAnswer(p):
from binascii import hexlify, unhexlify

iden = p.recvline()[:-1]
print("Checking for %s" % iden)
inp = unhexlify(getCheck(iden))
data = [ord(inp[i]) ^ (i | i << 4) for i in range(len(inp))]
data = [chr(data[i] & 0xf | data[0xf - i] & 0xf0) for i in range(len(inp))]
data = ''.join(data)

p = remote('keygenme.ctfcompetition.com', 1337)
while True:
Eventually it will try to process something invalid (that's the flag), but I
was lazy at that point and did not write code to process that.

### Decrypting the file
![The incredibly short decrypter code][10]

The first task that I would always do when given a mystery ELF binary is I will
pop it into IDA to check it out. When I opened this file, I saw the shortest
code... and then a bunch of data. Pretty quickly, I realized that this code was
trying to decrypt itself, and placing it in a mmap'd region. Then it invoked
itself. So I decided to extract this data, and then write a python script that
will decrypt this code for me:

from binascii import hexlify, unhexlify

k = unhexlify('8877665544332211')

i = 0
with open("encrypt_main", "rb") as inFile:
data = inFile.read()

with open("main_help", "wb") as outFile:

bx = []
for c in data:
bx += [c ^ k[i]]
i = (i + 1) % len(k)

I had to rewrite the python script multiple times (because I still can't seem to
figure out little endian from big endian!!) Eventually, I opened up the
decrypted binary file in IDA (you have to select the binary file option since
this is just raw x86 code), and I was greeted with a lot of hand-crafted
assembly code.

This code had a lot of syscalls embedded, so I used this [handy dandy syscall
table][2] to try to decipher all the syscall numbers. While looking through this
binary I found quite a few calls to `ptrace`. Initially, I thought this merely
served as an anti-debugger, (early on, the program attempted to detach any
debuggers, but I decided to patch that, so I can use `strace` and `gdb` to debug
it). Little did I know, this will come back to haunt me.

Oh some interesting construct to note. There were a few such thunk procedures,
like the following:

call _thunk
; some data...

; ...

pop rax
When the program would call a function such as `_get_data`, it would first call
`_thunk`, which pushes the return address (or in this case, the address to the
data element), then thunk will pop this return address and then return from
`_get_data`. It's a little bit hairy, but it's definitely going to screw with
some disassemblers/decompilers.

### The Fork in the Road
![The fork in the road][12]

Then shortly after, I come across this large function that executes a `fork`
syscall. I come to a part of the code where this program starts going
jump-happy. The problem is, for some reason, IDA does not know that and does not
try to mark this as part of the large function. After playing around with IDA, I
found that going to `Edit -> Function -> Append Function Tail` and then
selecting its parent function, you can manually add some code segment into the
function. This allows me to place this within the code flow graph of the
function. (You may have to delete any previous functions that IDA sees in this
code segment in order to append function tail).

Now there is a fork in the road, which way do I go? The parent or child? It
seems like both ways, there's quite a bit of code involved. I decided to go the
child first (which was the better move, I found).

### The Child's Setup
![Assembly code for child][3]

First I found two `read` syscalls, of different lengths, subsequently placing
them into an mmap'd region. At first, I had no idea what it is doing, so I
decided to just skip it over. Then I found a random syscall to `prctl`, setting
`PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS` to `true`. I had NO idea what is this code doing. I
consulted the manpage for `prctl` anyways, but I still had no idea why you want
to tell the kernel that you don't need anymore priviliges. Hmm...

Then the program made a syscall to `seccomp`. I read the manpage for it... Under

> The value of flags must be 0, and args must be NULL.

Hmm... I guess since the program passes the value 1 to `flags`, does it work
anymore...? Maybe not... Well, turns out, when I ran it with `strace` I found
that the syscall indeed fails:

> `seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT, 1, NULL) = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)`

I guess they put that there just to fool with you. Well I guess I'm lucky to
have read the manpage with that. Then I went on and saw that the program
immediately after, made a `seccomp` syscall with operation set to
`SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER`. From my basic understanding of seccomp, I know that
it allows you to filter an arbitrary number of syscalls. I allows you to create
arbitrary filters by using a bytecode called `BPF` (Berkeley Packet Filter),
baked directly into the kernel. It was initally used for filtering socket
packets, but then it was adapted for a `seccomp` syscall. I always wanted to try
this out, but never got it to work (I realized the reason why was because there
was not a glibc wrapper for the `seccomp` syscall, you had to make basic
syscalls to make it work).

Initially, I decided to skip over this BPF code, because trying to learn a new
language is going to take a while for me. Turns out, later, I had to figure out
the code anyways. Then I finally stumbled upon this part of the manpage:

> In order to use the SECCOMP\_SET\_MODE\_FILTER operation, either the caller
must have the CAP\_SYS\_ADMIN capability, or the thread must already have the
no\_new\_privs bit set.

Oooohhh! So that's why the syscall to `prctl` is made. And this manpage also
explains why this must carried out:

> This requirement ensures that an unprivileged process cannot apply a malicious
filter and then invoke a set-user-ID or other privileged program using
execve(2), thus potentially compromising that program.

So yeah, this is a security feature, similar to why `LD_PRELOAD` automatically
gets removed across `setuid` binaries. Then the child makes a call to `ptrace`
with `TRACE_ME`. This construct is often very familiar to anti-debugging
purposes because the program can use this to check whether if another program is
already debugging it (in that case, `ptrace` returns an error code, and the
program can check for this code, and branch somewhere else). However, in this
code I see that the child actually does NOT check for any branch, so maybe it
uses `ptrace` for something else. That was when it dawned on me that maybe the
parent process is trying to "debug" or trace the child process. Then it calls a
function that extracts an ELF binary and then writes it into a temporary
memory-file using the `memfd_create` syscall. I decided to go into its
decryption function, only to realize there's quite a bunch of code, and I could
basically ignore most of it and just treat it as a blackbox. What I did instead,
was run gdb all the way up to the `execve` syscall later on, and just copy over
the ELF binary it generates (after all, it is just regular-ole file that is
actually in memory).

### The parent's patching task
![A snippet of the parent's fork path][6]

When I opened up the resulting [elf binary][4], I was initially relieved
(Finally! I found a regular ELF binary. Glad I don't have to deal with some more
hand-crafted assembly code!) Then I noticed something was amiss. Initially, IDA
warned me that some of the .plt entries have been modified. Hmm... maybe
something is wrong? Then I found this corrupted start function:
![corrupted start function][5]
Ugghh! What is that `int3` in the middle of that start function? I remembered,
that there was that `TRACE_ME` call that occurred earlier, so I realized it
doesn't cause a `SIGTRAP` signal, but it will result in the binary being stopped
until the parent intercedes. So then I realized, it is time to look at the
parent's fork process.

Then I started to sort of struggle a bit with this code. At this point, I was
already hours and hours into this, and I was starting grow weary of this. But I
realized I was getting close and I basically unlocked most of the code, so I
went on. I found that the parent was looping infinitely, waiting the the child
to stop (as a result of `int3`, which is a trap), then it first tries to get the
starting base address of the child (the binary is a PIE), and then it makes a
few debugging syscalls. Gradually I realized, it was first getting the `rip`
register of the child, then "patching" the code there, and restarting the child.
It also unpatches the previous stop location, so that you never get a fully
patched executable.

So I decided to come up with a brilliant idea. I ran strace with the PARENT,
filtered out the `process_vm_writev` syscalls (those write to another process's
memory) by passing `-e trace=process_vm_writev` to `strace`, then filtered out
those writes that "unpatched" the binary, and then patched the binary myself. I
decided to first pipe strace output to a file, and ran a few `sed` statements so
that I get it into the form `"<PATCH>" <ADDR>`. I copied the elf binary to the
filename `elf2.patch.bin` Then this python script will patch the binary:
import sys
import mmap

with open("elf2.patch.bin", "rw+b") as f:
mm = mmap.mmap(f.fileno(), 0)
for line in sys.stdin:
inp = line[:-1].split(' ')
if eval(inp[0])[0] == '\xcc':

data = eval(inp[0])
off = eval(inp[1]) - 0x555555554000
mm[off:off+len(data)] = data
Luckily, the runtime addresses ACTUALLY correspond one-to-one to the offsets in
the ELF binary file. Here's the [patched binary][7].

### Breaking the code
I found that the second `read` that I found a while back in the child
corrrespond to `argv[1]` of the binary. So I gave the patched binary some value
to chew on. I ran it. Hmm... no output. This similarly happened when I ran the
actual binary. Except when I ran the network server, I get some response "BAD".
Hmm... at this point, I realized the binary they gave me, and the actual binary
running on the network server are DIFFERENT! Oh well, okay then.

I decided to run the program under `strace` to see what it is up to. Hmm, I'm
getting an `exit_group(1)` syscall. That's odd. I searched for some exit call.
Hmm... I found only one instance in some weird if-statement chain. After some
more struggling, I realized this code is decoding a hex string. What hex string?
The one I was suppose to supply as argument! Oooh! It looks like I need to
supply a hexdump of 16 characters (or 32 hexadecimal digits). So it looks like
it is failing because I wasn't giving it valid hexadecimal digits (or enough of
them). Then after giving it a proper length, I ran it, it screamed `NO!` at me.
Okay... you don't have to be that rude. Actually, clarification, at first it
gave me a "trap signal" because I never ran into this part of the code before.
So I reran the whole program and repatched my binary.

Then I found some sort of long-ass code that is generating a hash of some sort.
At that point I realize the zeroth argument, `argv[0]` was actually determined
by the first `read` syscall. Ohh... so I guess the network program already
supplied the first argument, and I have to figure out what correct hash to put
for the second argument. The small problem is, (well actually two), a) I did not
want to reverse engineer the code to compute the hash (it seemed so long), b)
the program actually encrypts our hash that we provide before checking.

### Flags of a correct environment
I verified this behavior by using `ltrace` and searching for the `strcmp` call:
![A reproduction of the ltrace][8]

Okay, so I guess the first hash is our input encrypted, and the second hash is
the generated one. Hmm.. but then what are those `umask` and `getenv` calls for
hmm?? I read the manpage for `umask`:

> umask() sets the calling process's file mode creation mask (umask) to mask &

Okay... so not a lot of useful information here. So I guess it sets the creation
mask to zero??? That's very weird... And I also checked `getenv`, it checks the
existence of the `PWD` environment variable, but does not actually use the
value... weird... Okay so at first I though `PWD` was a password environment
variable of some sort, but then I realzied that it is just the current working
directory. Then I realized, maybe the program are using these two functions as
"flags" to make sure that it is in the correct environment. Otherwise, it will
just generate invalid hashes. The `getenv` I caught on immediately, but then the
`umask` slipped out of my mind for a while. Then I realized that the BPF that I
overlooked a while back may have something to do with this. I read the manpage:

> This system call **always** succeeds...

Hmm... maybe it might not succeed if there was a BPF filter for it. Here was the
BPF filtering rules:
![bpf rules][9]

At this point, I decided to tackle BPF again. It is actually a pretty
interesting language. It can be roughly translated into this:
LOADABS 0x4 # load architecture type
IFEQU 0xc00000003e PASS, # value for AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64
LOADABS 0x0 # load syscall number
IFGEQ 0x400000000 GOTO SIGERR,
IFEQU 0x5f GOTO ERR, # check if this `umask` syscall
RET 0x7fff0000 # send OKAY
RET 0x50001 # send error code 1 (INVAL)
RET 0 # send SEGSYS
It tests to see if the syscall number is equaled to 0x5f or `umask`.
Coincidence? I don't think so. Maybe the ELF binary checks whether if umask is
blocked. If it is, it will generate a different hash than if it wasn't. (I did
not realize this until much, much later).

### Hacking with ltrace
So I just wrote a quick C program that ran the `execve` syscall, passing in the
arguments to the patched elf binary.
#define _GNU_SOURCE

#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>

#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>

#define BLK(a, b, c, d) ((struct sock_filter) {a, b, c, d})

struct sock_filter prog[8] = {
BLK(0x20, 0, 0, 4), // LD arch
BLK(0x15, 0, 5, 0xC000003E),
BLK(0x20, 0, 0, 0), // LD nr
BLK(0x35, 3, 0, 0x40000000), //
BLK(0x15, 1, 0, 0x5F),
BLK(6, 0, 0, 0x7FFF0000), //okay
BLK(6, 0, 0, 0x50001), // errno with 1
BLK(6, 0, 0, 0)}; // kill

int main(int argc, char** argv, char** envp) {
struct sock_fprog pr = {8, prog};

prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
syscall(SYS_seccomp, SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &pr);
execve(argv[1], argv + 2, 0);
I am proud of myself of correctly using `seccomp` for the first time!

To quickly figure out what this program is comparing the hash to, I just ran
ltrace and extracted the strcmp call. Oh... and they encrypted the hash using
an xor. I automated this whole thing with the python script mentioned before at
the very top. QED.

EDIT: I forgot to also mention, they reversed ONLY the top digits of the hash
value of each byte as well, so `a1b2c3d456` would become `51d2c3b4a6`. I think
they did that so that the resulting encrypted code would not be too obvious.

### Running the network service
There was a slight hiccup when I was trying to run the network service.
Apparently, they wanted you to solve a lot keys before spitting out the flag. I
have already pretty much automated the whole thing, but I was sad that it still
timed out because my network lagged too much qq (probably caused by being on the
other side of the world). Luckily, I had a server that could provide less
network latency (that was located in the US).

I also kept on having issues with finding the correct hash to solve for because
I kept on overlooking the `umask` syscall block, and I kept second-guessing
myself on the `getenv` part. Well that's it for this problem.

[1]: //thekidofarcrania.gitlab.io/files/gctf/keygen/keygenme.zip
[2]: http://blog.rchapman.org/posts/Linux_System_Call_Table_for_x86_64/
[3]: //thekidofarcrania.gitlab.io/files/gctf/keygen/child.png
[4]: //thekidofarcrania.gitlab.io/files/gctf/keygen/elf2.bin
[5]: //thekidofarcrania.gitlab.io/files/gctf/keygen/corrupted.png
[6]: //thekidofarcrania.gitlab.io/files/gctf/keygen/parent.png
[7]: //thekidofarcrania.gitlab.io/files/gctf/keygen/elf2.patch.bin
[8]: //thekidofarcrania.gitlab.io/files/gctf/keygen/strcmp.png
[9]: //thekidofarcrania.gitlab.io/files/gctf/keygen/bpf.png
[10]: //thekidofarcrania.gitlab.io/files/gctf/keygen/main.png
[11]: http://thekidofarcrania.gitlab.io/2018/06/25/gctf/
[12]: //thekidofarcrania.gitlab.io/files/gctf/keygen/fork.png

Original writeup (http://thekidofarcrania.gitlab.io/2018/06/25/gctf/).